The victory of Hamas and its repercussions

A significant success of Hamas in the Palestinian general election of January 25 had been predicted by many observers, even if the outright majority obtained by the group in the new Palestinian Legislative Council has gone beyond all expectations.
However, nearly all Western mainstream media have started a frenzy of agitated comments as soon as the scale of Hamas landslide victory has become clear. It doesn’t matter that the election were substantially free and fair: those people voted “badly”.
Rigged elections à la Mubarak, with frauds, intimidations and a five-year jail term verdict for the opposition exponent Ayman Nour (under forgery charges that are believed to be trumped up) are evidently closer to the kind of “democracy” that should be exported in the Arab world.

First of all, what is Hamas?
Hamas is the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, an Islamic radical movement founded in Egypt in 1928 by Hassan al-Banna. The August 18, 1988 Statute describe Hamas as an “Islamic resistence movement” which fights for the liberation of Palestine. The name ﺤﻤﺎﺱ means “fervor” but it also the acronym of Harakat al-muqawwamah al-islamiyyah (literally “Movement of Islamic resistence”).

With a certain degree of simplification, two different trends can be outlined within the group: a “military wing” engaged in paramilitary violent actions (including suicide bombings against civilian targets in Israel) and a “social wing” more keen on charitable activities. This distinction is sometimes read as a cleavage between a “radical current”, which supports the armed seizure of power, and a “neo-traditionalist current”, which is faithful to the view of Antonio Gramsci and tries to pursue Islamization at the grass roots, establishing a network of mosques, schools, labor unions, healthcare units and benevolent foundations in any village and neighborhood.

Religion is a determinant element in the development of Hamas, although complex economic, social and political motives are intertwined.

When enemies usurp a part of Muslim land, jihad becomes an individual duty for each Muslim. In face of the usurpation of Palestine by means of the Jews, we shall raise the banner of jihad. This requires the propagation of an Islamic consciousness among the people at a local, Arab and Islamic level. It is necessary to instill the spirit of jihad within the ummah, confront the enemies and join the ranks of the fighters.

The aim of the movement seems to be the transformation of the whole of Palestine into an Islamic state ruled by shari’ah.

The Movement of Islamic Resistence is a unique Palestinian movement. It offers its allegiance to God, stems its lifestyle from Islam, and strives to raise the banner of God over every inch of the land of Palestine, for under Islam it is possible to the followers of all religions to coexist in safety: safety for their lives, their properties and their rights. It is in the absence of Islam that strife is rife, oppression and destruction spread, wars and fights break out.

However, Hamas is not a monolith and contains more pragmatic currents, in particular in the West Bank. It has also been able to match “the poetry of rhetoric with the prose of reality” in the past and it may try to portray a softer version of itself, even through the attempt at an image makeover.
(Update: Nashat Afqash later remarked that he received a payment of 180,000 NIS shekels, not US dollars as stated in the article.)

Of course, there’s more than a matter for spin doctors. One of the most controversial points raised by the Western media is that, even if Hamas restrained from violent actions over a prolonged period of time, it wouldn’t be possible to legitimize a movement which does not intend to acknowledge the existence of Israel.
Moshir al-Masri, the spokesman of Hamas in Gaza, responds to this (but skates over hitting civilian targets) in an interview given to Silvia Cattori of Réseau Voltaire shortly before the election.
On mutual recognition and propensity towards a peaceful deal, it is worth to remember how the Likud platform looked like, at least before Ariel Sharon restyled himself as “a man of peace”:

The Jewish communities in Judea, Samaria and Gaza are the realization of Zionist values. Settlement of the land is a clear expression of the unassailable right of the Jewish people to the Land of Israel and constitutes an important asset in the defense of the vital interests of the State of Israel.

The Government of Israel flatly rejects the establishment of a Palestinian Arab state west of the Jordan river. The Palestinians can run their lives freely in the framework of self-rule, but not as an independent and sovereign state.

Israeli historian Avi Shlaim once wrote:

Pope John Paul II is said to have described two solutions to the problems of the Middle East, one realistic, the other miraculous. The realistic solution would involve divine intervention, while the miraculous calls for the Arabs and Jews to resolve their differences.

The most striking mystifications are made by some commentators who lump everything together: Hamas, al-Qa’idah, the Iraqi insurgency and the multiform galaxy of militant, radical Islamic groups.
In fact, the term “militant Islamic” (or the very disputable “Islamist”) is so broad that it ends up encompassing any kind of subversive movement in the Muslim world, despite the variety of histories, contexts and resources. The only things these formations have in common is a discourse (based on the rhetoric of jihad as warfare) which may justify the use of force or violence in order to establish a political system based on the implementation of shari’ah. These groups can differ strongly in tactics and strategies.

Reuven Paz of GLORIA (a research center based in Herzliya, Israel) has written an interesting article entitled The Islamic Debate Over Democracy: Jihadi-Salafi Responses to Hamas’ Victory in the Palestinian Elections in which he introduces a number of interesting remarks about how other militant Islamic groups have reacted to the victory of Hamas and its possible future leadership of the Palestinian Authority.

According to Paz as well as other scholars, militant Islamic groups usually scorn the concept of democracy (in its Western interpretation, at least) and reject human-made laws as a form of heresy that deviates from the divine law. The legitimacy of elections and parliamentary representation remains therefore highly controversial and has been ruled out in a series of Salafi-oriented fatwas (edicts). Paz reminds, for instance, that a list of clerics who condemn the electoral process has been posted in a forum of the radical site Al-Hisbah. The Muslim Brotherhood, on the other hand, seems to have a strong tendency to support democratic processes in countries where the prospect of a favourable electoral result is more likely.
Another unsettled account concerns the “national” character of Hamas. The 1988 covenant tries to link the Palestinian national cause to a broader Islamic one:

According to the Movement of Islamic Resistence, nationalism is a legitimate part of its religious creed. Nothing in nationalism is more significant or deeper than fighting a jihad against the enemy and face him openly when he sets foot on Muslim land.

Given this contex, the liberation of Palestine is an individual, inderogable duty for every Muslim, wherever he may be. It is upon these bases that the Palestinian question should be viewed, and every Muslim should realize this.

However, Paz remembers that many militant groups have considered Hamas as a Palestinian nationalist formation which has waged a “jihad for the homeland” rather than a jihad fi sabilAllah (a struggle for the sake of God), isolating its case from rest of the ummah. Because of its national focus, Hamas also does not disdain to cooperate with Iran and Lebanese Shi’a HizbAllah, which are generally viewed at with disgust by Salafi groups. The movement also expressed support for Yasser Arafat, who was labelled murtadd (apostate) by some Salafi groups.

After the election, these groups remain in a watchful wait. On one hand, they intend to offer their “advice and guidance” to Hamas. On the other hand, they harshly criticize the movement for it finds itself in an almost irresolvable dilemma: either step up the level of confrontation with Israel, the United States and the Western community, or soften (and possibly contradict) its prior positions in order to reach a compromise.
The more aggressive Salafi groups might try to step in and take advantage of the shortcomings of Hamas. I think it’s worth to quote Paz verbatim:

The Jihadi-Salafis would certainly try to push Hamas into more hard-line positions, through a slow infiltration into the Palestinian public. In case Hamas would gradually change its policy towards Israel and even abandon terrorism for a long temporary period, the global Jihadi groups such as al-Qaeda or affiliated elements may try to take the ‘torch of Jihad’ and establish affiliated groups in the Palestinian territories. We should bear in mind that the new situation in the Palestinian Authority could dismantle the Fatah, institute much change in the Palestinian security forces, and create new political, military, or family alliances, not to mention an interim period of chaos, more unemployment and financial difficulties, and an altogether unstable situation. Such conditions may be a golden opportunity for the Jihadi-Salafiyyah to find supporting elements among the Palestinians in the Palestinian Authority, as they slowly but surely currently do in some of the Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon.

This should ring as an alarm bell in Israel and elsewhere. By discreting Arafat, Hamas took the lead. Now, by discreting Hamas, it could be the turn of al-Zarqawi and his acolytes.